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Development of the Concept of Inferential Validity
David Moshman and Bridget A. Franks
University of Nebraska—Lincoln
Abstract
An argument is valid if its conclusion necessarily follows from its premises, regardless of whether
the premises and conclusion are empirically true or false. This research tested the hypothesis that
understanding validity of inference (including its differentiation from empirical truth) is a relatively late development. Students in Experiment 1 were asked to sort sets of deductive arguments.
None of the fourth graders used validity as a basis for distinguishing arguments, while 45% of the
seventh graders and 85% of the college students did so. Experiments 2 and 3 explored whether
the dramatic age difference could be narrowed by (a) varying the types of arguments used, (b) explaining the concept of validity and instructing students to use it, and/or (c) providing feedback
after each trial. Fourth-grade performance remained poor, while seventh-grade performance increased to nearly the level of the college students. It was concluded that the concept of validity
typically develops between ages 10 and 12 but that application of that competence continues to increase over a much longer age span. Students not understanding validity commonly evaluated arguments on the basis of empirical truth of component propositions, though even fourth graders revealed an implicit awareness of logical form.

knowledge implicit in an earlier structure achieves
explicit representation (Bickhard, 1978). The child
in stage 1 may act in accord with logical norms (e.g.,
in seriating blocks or deducing the conclusion to a
transitive argument) but does not grasp the concept
of logical necessity. The stage 2 child, by contrast,
distinguishes conclusions that are logically necessary from those that are merely empirically likely
or conventionally accepted. Reasoning at this level,
however, is always within the context of premises
accepted as true or reasonable. The child does not focus on the abstract form of the argument as a whole.
Thus, although stage 1 and stage 2 children can often distinguish valid arguments (in which the conclusion follows necessarily from the premises) from
invalid arguments (in which this is not the case), the
concept of a necessary, content-independent relation
between premises and conclusion is only implicit in
their thinking, rather than being an object of explicit
awareness.

Research on deductive reasoning and its development has included work on (a) conclusions reached or
preferred by individuals who are presented with various combinations of premises (e.g., Hawkins, Pea,
Glick, & Scribner, 1984), (b) the way these premises
and conclusions are mentally represented (e.g., Neimark & Chapman, 1975), (c) real-time mental processes involved in reaching or evaluating these conclusions (e.g., Braine, 1978), and (d) the more abstract
cognitive structures underlying these processes at various levels of development (e.g., Moshman, 1977).
Another line of investigation increasingly represented
in the literature involves the development of metalogical knowledge—knowledge about the nature of logic.
The major locus of such research has been on the development of concepts of logical necessity.
Moshman and Timmons (1982) proposed a
three-stage model of the development of logical necessity. The model is based on a conception of development in which each new level of understanding
is constructed via active coordination of and metacognitive reflection on earlier concepts, such that

The stage 3 individual, by contrast, not only distinguishes valid from invalid arguments but can think
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explicitly about the form of an argument, thus differentiating the necessity of the relation between premises and conclusion from the empirical truth or falsity
of each proposition. An individual who has attained
this level of metalogical understanding may be said
to have a mature concept of inferential validity.
Available evidence is consistent with the first
two stages of the model in that preschool children
can make correct deductions from a wide variety of
premises (e.g., Braine & Rumain, 1983; Hawkins et
al., 1984) while the (stage 2) ability to distinguish
conclusions required by given premises from conclusions merely made plausible by those premises develops during middle childhood (e.g., Bereiter, Hidi,
& Dimitroff, 1979; Pieraut-Le Bonniec, 1980), probably beginning about age 6 (Somerville, Hadkinson,
& Greenberg, 1979), Unfortunately, there is almost
no research on the development of the stage 3 concept of inferential validity. Some indirect indications
consistent with the three-stage model are provided by
studies showing relatively late development of concepts of tautology and logical contradiction (Cummins, 1978; Osherson & Markman, 1975) and by
Piagetian theory, which associates hypotheticodeductive reasoning (such as deducing a conclusion from
premises known to be false) with the emergence of
formal operations (Inhelder & Piaget, 1958),
The primary purpose of the present research
was to look more directly at children’s and adults’
understanding of the concept of validity. It was hypothesized that understanding and use of this concept would be a relatively late development, rare in
9–10-year-olds and increasingly prevalent beginning
in early adolescence.
Experiment 1 focused on spontaneous use of the
concept of validity. This was studied via an adaptation of the “Rep Test,” a procedure developed by
personality theorist George Kelly (1955) to assess
the constructs or categories spontaneously applied
by an individual in construing his or her experience.

Experiment 1
Method
Subjects.—The participants were 20 fourth graders (13 boys and seven girls), ranging in age from
9-0 to 10-6 (mean = 9-8); 20 seventh graders (10
boys and 10 girls), ranging in age from 12-0 to 143 (mean = 13-0); and 41 undergraduates (31 females and 10 males), ranging in age from 18 to 37
years (mean = 21.3). The children were all volun-

teers from public schools in Lincoln, Nebraska, and
the undergraduates were recruited from a course required of all education majors at the University of
Nebraska–Lincoln.
All fourth and seventh graders were asked at the
conclusion of their participation whether they had
any previous experience that seemed related to and/
or helped them with the tasks they had just done.
None cited any formal training in logic. College students were asked whether they had taken a course in
logic. The few that had done so were not included
in the experiment. No students at any age gave any
indication during the research (e.g., through use of
technical terminology) that formal training in logic
was responsible for their performance. If any of the
participants had studied any logic (e.g., syllogistic
forms), apparently the present tasks were too different from the content of their course work for them to
see any connection.
Materials: seven arguments.—Seven arguments
were constructed by systematically varying (a) truth
of premises, (b) truth of conclusion, and (c) validity of argument form (see Table 1). To highlight the
logical nature of the task, each argument was placed
in an “If . . . then” format. Since the research was intended to focus on conceptions about the nature of
logical arguments rather than facility with particular
inference patterns, simple logical forms were used
throughout. The intent was to maximize the likelihood that, if students understood the idea of distinguishing valid from invalid arguments, they would
easily be able to determine which of the present arguments belonged in which category. Six of the arguments involved transitive inference, which Piaget
associates with concrete operations (beginning about
age 7) and researchers in the information processing
tradition view as understood by children as young
as 4 (see Breslow, 1981). For the seventh (and third
valid) argument, a simple disjunctive inference was
used to insure that the three valid arguments could
not be distinguished from the others simply on the
basis of identical logical form.
Materials: test booklets.—Test booklets (for the
college students) were constructed using the seven
arguments of Table 1. Each booklet presented a series of tasks intended to provide students with multiple opportunities to spontaneously distinguish arguments on the basis of validity. Page 1 of each booklet
presented general instructions and a sample exercise
involving three geometric figures. Each of the next
three pages presented three arguments and asked the
student to “find as many ways as you can that two of
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Table 1
Seven Arguments in Experiment 1
Premises:

Both True

At Least One False

Form of argument:

Valid

Invalid

Valid

Invalid

Conclusion:
True
False

1
*

2
3

4
7

5
6

1. If elephants are bigger than dogs
And dogs are bigger than mice
Then elephants are bigger than mice
2. If adults are older than babies
And children are older than babies
Then adults are older than children
3. If dogs are bigger than mice
And elephants are bigger than mice
Then dogs are bigger than elephants
4. If dogs are bigger than elephants
And elephants are bigger than mice
Then dogs are bigger than mice
5. If babies are older than adults
And babies are older than children
Then adults are older than children
6. If mice are bigger than dogs
And mice are bigger than elephants
Then dogs are bigger than elephants
7. If elephants are either animals or plants
And elephants arc not animals
Then elephants are plants

* No such argument is possible since a valid argument with true premises cannot have a false conclusion.

the following are similar and the other is different”
and to provide a written explanation for each sorting.
One of these three pages presented arguments 1, 2,
and 3; one presented 4, 5, and 6; and one presented
1, 2, and 7 (see Table 1). The particular groupings of
arguments were designed to provide several distinct
potential sortings on each page. Thus, for example,
arguments 1, 2, and 3 can be sorted on the basis of
validity (1 vs. 2 and 3), truth of conclusion (1 and 2
vs. 3), or content (1 and 3 vs. 2). Order of the three
pages was systematically varied across test booklets.
Page 5 was identical with pages 2, 3, and 4, except that all seven arguments were presented and
the instructions specified that each sorting should
divide the seven arguments into two groups (again
along any dimension that the student could think of
and again with an explanation of the basis for each

sorting). Finally, page 6 presented the same seven arguments with instructions to order them from “most
logical” to “least logical” (with ties allowed) and to
explain this ranking.
Procedure.—College students were tested in
groups of about eight or 10. The experimenter
handed out the test booklets, carefully went through
the instructions and sample exercise, solicited questions, and remained present in case of difficulties.
The same arguments and the same sequence
of tasks were used for the younger students. There
were, however, some major procedural differences
designed to avoid false negatives by making it as
easy as possible for children to demonstrate any inclination to think about arguments in terms of their
validity.
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First, the arguments appeared on index cards that
could be sorted and ranked physically. Second, students were individually interviewed by the first author and their responses were tape-recorded so that it
was unnecessary for them to deal with a test booklet
or express themselves in writing. Third, each fourth
grader was asked to read the first few cards aloud to
ascertain that reading was not a source of difficulty
(it was not). Fourth, in sorting the set of all seven
arguments, children were permitted, if they wished,
to use more than two categories in a single sorting.
Fifth, the interview procedure allowed for follow-up
questions by the interviewer to ascertain whether validity might be involved in what initially appeared
to be an insufficient explanation. Finally, on each
set of three arguments, if a given child did not spontaneously produce all three possible ways of dividing them, the experimenter would demonstrate each
missing division of the cards, including the valid
versus invalid division, and ask whether that division made any sense and, if it did, why.

the basis of the content of the terms (e.g., animals vs.
people) and/or relations (e.g., size vs. age).

Scoring.—Students’ sortings of each set of arguments were classified on the basis of which cards
they placed together and their explanations. In the
case of fourth and seventh graders, full credit for understanding validity (or any other basis for sorting)
was given for post hoc explanation of sortings suggested by the interviewer. Seven mutually exclusive
categories were used:

The major analysis of each student’s ranking
of the seven arguments consisted of determining
whether she or he placed the three valid arguments
(1, 4, and 7) as the three most logical (regardless
of whether those were perceived as tied with each
other or were placed in some order). Because there
seemed to be no systematic basis for such rankings
other than validity and since the probability of such
a ranking being produced by chance is less than 3%,
no explanation was required (though adequate validity explanations were usually provided).

1. Validity.—Student separates valid from invalid
argument(s), indicating that in the case of the valid
argument(s) the conclusion must be true provided
the premises were true (because of the form of the
argument), while for invalid argument(s) one could
not tell from the premises whether or not the conclusion were true (though one might be certain of its
truth or falsity on the basis of other empirical knowledge). Formal explication of the distinction between
validity and truth is not required, but the explanation
must be sufficient to rule out sortings based on form,
truth, content, or partial matching (see below).
2. Form.—Student notes similarity and/or difference in abstract form of argument but does not indicate that one form is superior to another in terms
of the logicality of the connection between premises
and conclusion.
3. Truth.—Student distinguishes arguments on
the basis of whether the premises and/or conclusions
are empirically true or false.
4. Content.—Student differentiates arguments on

5. Partial matching.—Arguments are matched
on the basis of having the same or comparable words
in a particular location (e.g., two arguments both use
the word “dog” as the first term in the conclusion).
6. Mixed.—Student sorts the set of seven arguments into three or more categories based on an idiosyncratic combination of factors (e.g., true conclusions vs. animal content vs. human content).
7. Miscellaneous.—Explanation missing, not fitting above categories, insufficient to classify, or not
in accord with student’s own grouping of cards.
Reliability was assessed by having a second coder classify 50 randomly chosen written responses. Agreement with the original rater was 82%
(with 98% agreement on the critical question of
whether or not each sorting reflected an understanding of validity).

Results
Validity.—Not a single fourth grader ever used
the concept of validity in sorting or ranking the
cards. Of the seventh graders, 35% sorted one or
more of the trios on the basis of validity (with explanation), 20% sorted the set of all seven this way
(with explanation), and 35% chose the three valid
arguments as “most logical” in ranking the set of
seven. Corresponding figures for college students
were 78%, 46%, and 61%. Overall, the percentages
of fourth graders, seventh graders, and college students respectively using the concept of validity at
some point in the research (i.e., in at least one of the
four sortings—with explanation—or in the ranking)
were 0%, 45%, and 85%, χ2(2, N = 81) = 40.4, p <
.001. Fourth-grade performance was significantly
below that of seventh graders (binomial p < .01),
which in turn was significantly below that of college
students, χ2(1, N = 61) = 10.9, p < .001. Performance
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of males and females did not differ significantly at
any age. As individuals, the seventh graders spanned
the entire range of possible performance, with many
showing behavior indistinguishable from that of the
fourth graders and others providing sortings, rankings, and explanations indistinguishable from those
of the most sophisticated college students.
Other concepts used.—Table 2 shows the percentage of students at each grade using each of various bases for sorting. A series of χ2 tests showed
no age differences in sortings on the basis of content, truth, or partial matching (p > .10 in each case).
There were significant age differences in (a) sortings on the basis of validity, for trios, χ2(2, N = 81) =
34.6, p < .001; for set of seven, χ2(2 , N = 81) = 15.1,
p < .001; (b) sortings on the basis of form, for trios,
χ2(2, N = 81) = 19.6, p < .001; for set of seven, χ2(2,
N = 81) = 13.6, p < .01; and (c) miscellaneous sortings, for trios, χ2(2, N = 81) = 13.2, p < .01; for set of
seven, χ2(2,N = 81) = 19.4, p < .001.
Students in all three grades were remarkably
similar in the nearly universal use of content as a basis for distinguishing arguments, the very common
use of empirical truth, and the occasional use of partial matching. The major age difference is that sortings on the basis of form and validity were much less
common in the seventh graders than in the college
students and were entirely absent in the fourth graders. The relative absence of miscellaneous responses
in the children confirms the success of the interview
procedure in making it possible to assign vague or
incomplete initial explanations to nonmiscellaneous
categories on the basis of further questioning.
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Turning to the ranking data, the percentages of
students selecting the three valid arguments as the
three most logical for grades four, seven, and college respectively were, as noted earlier, 0%, 35%,
and 61%, χ2(2,N = 81) = 21.1, p < .001. Most of
the students who did not select the three valid arguments as most logical instead selected the two arguments (1 and 2) in which each of the three component propositions was empirically true. This pattern
accounted for the final ranking of 55% of the fourth
graders, 62% of those seventh graders who did not
use a validity ranking, and 63% of those college students who did not use a validity ranking. Similarly,
students not using validity commonly chose as least
logical either the three arguments (5, 6, and 7) containing two or more false propositions (25%, 46%,
and 31% for grades 4, 7, and college, respectively)
or the three arguments (3, 6, and 7) with false conclusions (20%, 23%, and 6% for the three groups,
respectively). In explaining their rankings, students not ranking by validity typically gave empirical truth (or some combination of validity and truth)
as their primary rationale (80%, 85%, and 87% for
the three groups, respectively). Overall, the results
of the rankings suggest a developmental trend from
(a) a very strong tendency among fourth graders to
interpret “most logical” as meaning most empirically true to (b) a modal tendency among college
students to interpret the same expression, at least in
the context of the present set of tasks, as meaning
most valid.
Remaining questions.—The results so far show
important changes beyond age 10 in how people
think about arguments. Fourth graders failed to dis-

Table 2
Percentage of Students Using Various Bases for Sorting Arguments in Experiment 1
Grade 4

Grade 7

College

Basis for sorting

Triosa

Alltb

Triosa

Alltb

Triosa

Alltb

Validity
Form
Truth
Content
Partial matching
Miscellaneous
Mixedc

0
0
60
100
30
10
–

0
0
45
85
15
0
25

35
15
70
90
35
10
–

20
5
30
95
25
0
40

78
51
66
95
17
46
–

46
34
34
85
15
39
–

a Percent

using the indicated concept or strategy in sorting at least one of the three sets of three arguments.
using the indicated concept or strategy in sorting the set of all seven arguments.
c Mixed sortings were possible only for fourth and seventh graders sorting the set of all seven arguments.
b Percent
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tinguish arguments on the basis of validity despite a
number of opportunities to do so. Their failure cannot be explained in terms of limited ability to verbalize their understanding since the age trend on the
ranking task (where no verbalization was required)
paralleled that on the sorting task. These data are
consistent with what we may call the competence
deficit hypothesis: fourth graders do not understand
the concept of validity.
There are, however, at least two other plausible explanations. One possibility is that the results
reflect not a competence deficit but rather a general
performance deficit: fourth graders may understand
the concept of validity but do not spontaneously apply it in distinguishing and evaluating arguments. A
third possibility is that the fourth graders have a specific performance deficit: they understand the concept of validity but have trouble applying it to particular forms of argument such as the transitive
arguments that were predominant in Experiment 1.
The main purpose of Experiment 2 was to decide among these three alternatives with respect to
the fourth graders. A secondary purpose was to consider these same three possibilities with respect to
the difference in performance between the seventh
graders and the college students. The possibility of a
specific performance deficit was explored by (a) presenting five types of argument, all known to be simple for young children, and (b) including a separate
“control” task designed to assess facility with each
argument type without requiring students to think
about the validity of the argument as a whole. The
possibility of a general performance deficit was investigated by defining validity, discussing examples of valid and invalid arguments, and specifically
asking students to use this concept in evaluating the
arguments on the main task. The intent was not to
teach the concept of validity but to elicit it if it was
already within the student’s competence.
Experiment 2
Method
Subjects.—The participants, all new volunteers,
were 18 fourth graders (13 boys and five girls), ranging in age from 9-1 to 11-4 (mean = 9-9); 18 seventh
graders (13 boys and five girls), ranging in age from
12-7 to 13-11 (mean = 13-0); and 20 college undergraduates (five males and 15 females), ranging in
age from 19 to 23 (mean = 20.9), none of whom had
taken a logic course. Children were recruited from
Lincoln public schools and the college students from

a class required of all education majors at the University of Nebraska–Lincoln.
Materials.—Each participant completed a sixpage test booklet and a two-page control task. The
first page of the booklet defined what it means for an
argument to be (a) valid (“the last line follows from
the earlier information. In other words, the last line
would have to be true if the earlier information were
true”) and (b) invalid (“the last line does not follow from the earlier information. In other words, the
last line could be false even if the earlier information were all true”). It then provided simple examples of (a) a valid argument with true premises and
conclusion, (b) a valid argument with false premises and conclusion, (c) an invalid argument with
true premises and conclusion, and (d) an invalid argument with false premises and conclusion. In each
case the explanation indicated whether the argument
was valid, explained why, and highlighted the difference between validity and truth. The remaining
pages of the booklet presented 40 arguments, with
instructions to label each as valid or invalid.
Five forms of valid argument were selected:
Transitivity (e.g., “Abe is taller than Bob; Bob
is taller than Chuck; therefore, Abe is taller than
Chuck”); Class instantiation, corresponding to
Braine and Rumain’s (1983) PL12 (e.g., “All horses
are fish; Blacky is a horse; therefore, Blacky is a
fish”); Disjunction, corresponding to Braine and Rumain’s N8 (e.g., “Either bears fly or birds fly; bears
do not fly; therefore, birds fly”); Conjunction, corresponding to Braine and Rumain’s N1 (e.g., “Cars
have motors; trucks have motors; therefore, cars
and trucks have motors”); and Reverse conjunction, corresponding to Braine and Rumain’s N2 (e.g.,
“Nickels and dimes are plants; therefore, dimes are
plants”). The transitivity form had been used in Experiment 1 on the basis of evidence of its simplicity.
The other four forms are all among those proposed
by Braine and Rumain (1983) as fundamental inference schemas of natural logic. Evidence summarized
by Braine and Rumain suggests that all are well understood by age 5 or 6.
For each of the five argument forms, an analogous but invalid form was constructed (e.g., for conjunction, “Cars have motors; trucks have motors;
therefore, trucks and buses have motors”), thus yielding 10 argument forms (one valid and one invalid for
each type of argument). Next, two variants of each
of the 10 forms were constructed in such a way as
to maintain the validity or invalidity of the form (i.e.,

D EVELOPMENT

OF THE

C ONCEPT

by reversing the order of the premises or the order of
two conjoined or disjoined terms), thus yielding 20
argument forms (two valid and two invalid for each
type of argument). Three arguments were then constructed for each of the 20 forms by filling in true
content (e.g., “Cars have motors,” as in the example above), false content (e.g., “Cars have wings”), or
neutral content (e.g., “Blorks have tails”), thus yielding 60 arguments. Because that seemed an excessive
number, 40 were systematically selected such that (a)
half of the arguments in each content category (true,
false, neutral) were valid and half invalid, and (b) true
and false content were equally represented in both the
valid and invalid variants of each of the five types of
argument. A single random order of the 40 arguments
was used for half of the test booklets at each age and
the reverse of that order for the other half.
The control task included ten written arguments
with neutral content, one for each of the ten valid
argument forms included in the test booklet. For
each of the ten arguments, the student was asked to
choose the better of two conclusions (e.g., “Stan is
older than Bob; David is older than Stan; (A) Therefore, David is older than Bob; (B) Therefore, Bob is
older than David”). In each case, one conclusion followed necessarily from the premises and the other
was inconsistent with them.
Procedure.—Students were tested in groups of
no more than four so that the experimenter could
monitor their attention to the definitions and examples and their understanding of the instructions. The
first author presented each student with a test booklet. He then read the definitions, examples, and instructions aloud while students read along. After
soliciting questions, he remained present while students worked on the test booklets. None had any difficulty following the directions. After completing the
test booklet, each student then completed the control
task. The entire session typically took 20–30 min.

Results
Performance was analyzed with respect to each
of two criteria—one fairly stringent and one quite
lax. The stringent criterion for success was correct
evaluation of at least 90% of the 40 arguments as
valid or invalid. The percentages of students meeting this criterion for grades four, seven, and college,
respectively, were 11%, 67%, and 80%, χ2(2, N =
56) = 19.9, p < .001. The proportion of males and
females meeting the criterion did not differ significantly at any age.
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The lax criterion was correct evaluation of at
least 70% of the arguments, representing a performance which, though quite inconsistent, was significantly (p < .01, one-tailed) above chance level. The
percentages of students meeting this criterion for
grades four, seven, and college, respectively, were
56%, 89%, and 100%. Most of the fourth graders
thus met the lax criterion, though their performance
as a group remained significantly inferior to that of
the seventh graders, χ2(1,N = 36) = 4.98, p < .05,
and college students (binomial p < .01). Again, there
were no sex differences.
Specific performance deficit.—One possible
explanation for the observed age differences is that
younger children have trouble understanding some
of the specific arguments used. It is certainly plausible that an individual might understand the distinction between valid and invalid arguments but be unable to determine, in the case of a particular type of
argument, which variants fit in which category.
To explore this possibility, the present study included a control task involving the same five types
of argument as the validity task but merely requiring subjects to select the best conclusion for a given
set of premises rather than to evaluate arguments as
valid or invalid. Performance on the control task was
excellent at each age. No subject scored less than
eight out of 10. Mean scores out of 10 (and % scoring 10 out of 10) for grades four, seven, and college,
respectively, were 9.6 (67%), 9.7 (78%), and 10.0
(100%). These results provide no support for the hypothesis that the younger subjects were simply confused by the types of argument used.
Further analysis showed that the overall age
trend on the main task held for each of the five types
of argument (see Table 3). Differences among argument types in frequency of consistently correct performance for the fourth graders were not significant
(binomial p > .10 for each pair). Again, the specific
performance deficit hypothesis is not supported.
General performance deficit versus competence deficit.—Although there appear to be strong
grounds for ruling out the specific performance deficit hypothesis, it is not so easy to choose between
the other two alternatives: general performance deficit versus competence deficit. The crux of the matter is the basis for the partial success of the substantial number of fourth graders who met the lax (70%)
criterion for success on the present task but not the
more stringent (90%) criterion. One possibility is
that these children understand the concept of validity
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Table 3
Percentage of Students at Each Grade Showing Perfect Performance (8/8) on Each Type of Argument
in Experiment 2
Type of Argument
Transitivity
Class instantiation
Conjunction
Reverse conjunction
Disjunction

Grade 4

Grade 7

College

17
6
28
28
22

50
44
72
67
61

85
50
70
90
85

but were somehow unable to apply it with reasonable
consistency. The other possibility is that the marginal
fourth graders have heuristics for correctly classifying many arguments but that their inconsistency reveals their lack of a genuine grasp of validity.
Further analysis aimed at addressing more directly just how children were reasoning about the arguments presented. The 40 arguments in the test
booklet included (a) 16 arguments with neutral content, (6) 12 arguments in which truth and validity corresponded (six valid arguments with true content and
six invalid arguments with false content), and (c) 12
arguments in which truth and validity conflicted (six
valid arguments with false content and six invalid arguments with true content). This final set of 12 may
be considered the core arguments on the test since, by
definition, a genuine grasp of the concept of validity
involves recognition of the distinction between validity and empirical truth. Moreover, the results of Experiment 1 suggest that fourth graders understand the
concept of empirical truth and use it as a basis for distinguishing arguments and evaluating their logicality.
How can total score on these 12 critical arguments be interpreted? A student who was consistently responding on the basis of validity would
obviously obtain a score of 12. A student who was
consistently evaluating items with true content as
valid and those with false content as invalid (despite
explicit instructions to the contrary) would miss every one of these items and thus score 0. Finally, a
student responding randomly would be expected to
obtain a score of about 6. A binomial test showed
that scores of 0, 1, 11, and 12 deviate significantly
(p < .01) from chance performance. Accordingly, all
students were divided into three categories: (a) score
of 0 or 1(indicating evaluation on basis of empirical
truth), (b) score between 2 and 10 (not significantly
different from chance), and (c) score of 11 or 12 (indicating evaluation on the basis of validity).

The percentages of students responding on the
basis of validity at a level significantly above chance
for grades 4, 7, and college, respectively, were 11%,
61%, and 75%, χ2(2, N = 56) = 16.8, p <.001. Seventh-grade performance was significantly better
than that of the fourth graders, χ2(1, N = 36) = 9.75,
p < .01, but did not differ significantly from that of
the college students, χ2(l, N = 38) = 0.85, p > .10.
Thus, on these critical items, very few fourth graders showed a grasp of validity and there was a sharp
increase with age. The results, however, do not support the view that those students not responding on
the basis of validity were systematically responding on the basis of truth. Only three students—two
fourth graders and a seventh grader—selected the
arguments with true content as valid at a level significantly greater than chance. What then were the
remaining students, including 78% of the fourth
graders, doing?
Although the performance of these remaining
students did not differ significantly from chance,
it seems unlikely that they were actually responding randomly. As we have already seen, most of
the fourth graders and nearly all of the older students scored significantly above chance level on the
test as a whole. A more plausible alternative is suggested by the excellent performance of all the students on the “control” task. Although the control
task was purposely designed so as not to require
students to think about the validity of entire arguments, it is difficult to see how one could consistently select proper deductive conclusions for the
10 sets of premises on this task without at least an
implicit grasp of logical form. It is likely that even
the fourth graders were also responding to the main
task on the basis of logical form but that, because
they do not really understand validity, they tended
to incorporate elements of truth and falsity in making their judgments.
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One source of support for the view that students have an implicit understanding of form prior
to understanding inferential validity is performance
on the 16 arguments with neutral content, in which
empirical truth is not an issue. A score of 14 or better on these arguments is significantly above chance
level (binomial p < .01, one-tailed). This criterion
was met by 39% of the fourth graders, 78% of the
seventh graders, and 90% of the college students,
χ2(2,N = 56) = 12.5, p < .01. Moreover, 94% of the
fourth graders (as well as 94% of the seventh graders and 100% of the college students) scored above
the chance score of 8, even if not significantly so. It
is difficult to account for the fact that nearly all the
fourth graders scored above chance on the neutral arguments, and many significantly so, without postulating some awareness of argument form.
If it is true, however, that younger children also
take truth into account when this is possible, then
they should be less likely to respond correctly to arguments where validity conflicts with truth than to
arguments where they correspond. To test this, each
student’s score on the 12 critical items where truth
and validity conflicted was compared with his or her
score on the 12 items where they corresponded. Of
the 18 fourth graders, 10 scored higher on arguments
where truth and validity corresponded than on arguments where they conflicted and only one showed
the reverse pattern (binomial p < .01, one-tailed).
For eight of the 10, the difference was fairly substantial (3 or more points). Overall, whereas 33% of
the fourth graders scored significantly above chance
level in distinguishing valid from invalid arguments
when validity corresponded to truth, only 11% did so
when truth and validity conflicted.
Of the 18 seventh graders, only six scored
higher on arguments where truth and validity corresponded than on arguments where they conflicted,
and seven showed the reverse pattern (binomial p >
.10). Only four of the 13 differences were substantial (3 or more points). Similarly, only three college
students scored higher on arguments where truth
and validity corresponded, and seven showed the reverse pattern (binomial p > .10). None of these differences exceeded 2 points. Thus, differences in performance on the two categories of arguments tended
to be small for the older students and did not favor
one category over the other, whereas for the fourth
graders the differences were more often substantial
and strongly tended to favor arguments where validity corresponded to truth. Despite explicit instructions to evaluate arguments on the basis of validity

OF

I NFERENTIAL V ALIDITY

161

and to ignore truth, fourth graders were less likely to
evaluate an argument as valid if its content was false
than if its content was true.
Although these data support the earlier conclusion that empirical truth played an important role in
the reasoning of many fourth graders, they also support the conclusion that it was rarely, if ever, the sole
consideration. Thus these analyses further support
the view that subjects not reasoning on the basis of
an explicit understanding of validity do consider the
form of arguments but are often inconsistent about
this and, in particular, commonly incorporate considerations of empirical truth. This is what one would
expect from an individual whose understanding of
logical form is only implicit in the unconscious operation of basic inference schemata (Braine, 1978)
rather than an object of explicit awareness.
On the whole, the results tend to support the
competence deficit hypothesis with respect to the
fourth graders. Even after careful definition of validity, detailed examples, and explicit instructions
to use this concept in evaluating arguments, only
two fourth graders were fairly consistent in distinguishing valid from invalid arguments for the entire set of 40 and only two (the same two students)
showed a significant tendency to distinguish validity
from truth on the critical set of 12. The difference in
Experiment 1 between seventh graders and college
students, by contrast, appears to have been due to a
general performance deficit in that seventh graders
performed at the level of college students under the
favorable conditions of Experiment 2. Seventh graders are less likely than college students to spontaneously use the concept of validity (a performance deficit revealed in Experiment l), but most do grasp that
concept (a competence revealed in Experiment 2).
Most 9–10-year-olds apparently do not grasp
the concept of inferential validity, and a genuine
grasp of this concept and its distinction from empirical truth develops rapidly beyond that age. It might
still be argued, however, that many of the fourth
graders really do grasp the concept of validity but
were not sufficiently consistent in applying it for
their competence to become apparent in the present
experiment. The aim of Experiment 3 was to decide
between these possibilities by giving students feedback after each judgment of validity. If the competence deficit explanation is correct, the fourth graders are really responding on a variety of bases other
than validity and would find it difficult to profit systematically from the feedback. If, instead, they do
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grasp validity and are simply inconsistent in applying it, then regular feedback should improve the consistency of their performance and thus reveal their
underlying competence.
Experiment 3
Method
Subjects.—The participants, all new volunteers,
were 20 fourth graders (three boys and 17 girls),
ranging in age from 9-0 to 10-5 (mean = 9-7); 20
seventh graders (12 boys and eight girls), ranging in
age from 12-5 to 13-5 (mean = 13-0); and 20 college
undergraduates (six males and 14 females), ranging
in age from 19 to 43 (mean = 22.0), none of whom
had taken a logic course. Once again, the children
were recruited from Lincoln public schools and the
college students from a course required of all education majors at the University of Nebraska–Lincoln.
Materials.—Each of the 40 arguments from Experiment 2 was typed on a separate index card. A
single random order of the cards was used for half of
the subjects in each age × explanation group (see below) and the reverse of that order for the other half.
Procedure.—Each student was assessed individually by the second author. Half of the students at
each age were randomly assigned to the explanation
condition. The experimenter first explained the concept of validity to them, using the definitions and examples from Experiment 2, and solicited questions.
She then presented the index cards one at a time and
asked them to sort each argument into one of two
piles—valid versus invalid. After each argument, the
experimenter indicated whether the student’s choice
was correct or incorrect and allowed the student, if
necessary, to move the card to the correct pile. Students were permitted at any time to look back at
cards already sorted for guidance.
The other half of the students at each age performed the same task but without an initial explanation of validity. They were simply told that a rule existed for sorting the cards and that their task was to
use the feedback from the experimenter to discover
the rule.
Scoring.—Students were credited with understanding validity if they correctly placed 90% of the
40 arguments or 90% of the last 20 or 90% of the
last 10.
Results
Age differences were substantial: The criterion
of success was met by only 10% of the fourth grad-

ers but by 75% of the seventh graders and 90% of
the college students, χ2(2, N = 60) = 30.6, p < .001.
As in Experiment 2, seventh-grade performance significantly exceeded that of the fourth graders, χ2(1,
N = 40) = 17.3, p < .001, but did not differ significantly from that of the college students (binomial p
> .10). Differences between the explanation and noexplanation groups were not significant. Most seventh graders and college students achieved criterion
regardless of whether they received prior explanation of validity, while few fourth graders (one out
of 10 in each condition) did so. The mean numbers
of correct choices for the explanation and no explanation groups, respectively, were 27.9 and 23.8 for
grade 4, 34.9 and 30.1 for grade 7, and 37.9 and 36.1
for college students. Once again, there were no sex
differences.
These results provide further support for a competence deficit explanation with respect to fourth
graders and a general performance deficit explanation with respect to seventh graders. Even with regular feedback, most fourth graders were unable to
achieve reasonable consistency in sorting simple
arguments on the basis of validity. Seventh graders, in contrast, were able to use the feedback to attain a level of performance comparable to that of
college students, thus revealing their underlying
competence.

General Discussion
Over the course of three studies of the concept of validity, we have varied (a) the nature of the
task (free sorting of several arguments, explanation
of sortings provided by experimenter, ranking from
most to least logical, evaluation of single arguments
as valid or invalid); (b) the forms of argument (transitive, disjunctive, etc.); (c) whether subjects were interviewed individually or tested in groups using test
booklets; (d) whether or not subjects were provided
with an initial explanation of validity; (e) whether
or not they were provided with regular feedback on
their responses; and (f) whether or not they were required to explain the basis for their responses.
The consistent difficulty of the fourth graders across this wide range of tasks, arguments, testing conditions, and criteria has led us to conclude
that they do not understand the concept of validity (a competence deficit) rather than that they were
failing to apply it in particular circumstances (a performance deficit). The hypothesis that fourth graders merely have trouble with particular types of ar-
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gument (e.g., the transitive arguments of Experiment
1) was rejected on the basis of poor performance
in Experiments 2 and 3 on a wide variety of arguments that were purposely selected (and independently shown) to be very simple. The possibility that
fourth graders do not spontaneously think about arguments in terms of validity but can do so if asked
to was ruled out on the basis of their failure to profit
from the explicit directions of Experiment 2. The
possibility that they are merely inconsistent and need
systematic feedback to keep them on track is countered by their inability to profit from such feedback
in Experiment 3. Finally, the possibility that they do
think in terms of validity but simply fail to provide
adequate verbal explanation of their understanding is
ruled out by the fact that no verbal explanation was
required in Experiments 2 or 3 or in the ranking task
of Experiment 1.
Nevertheless, no claim of lack of competence
can ever be conclusively proved. It remains possible that some new task and/or conditions can be devised that will reveal a grasp of validity in children
younger than the present results indicate. A key issue
in attempting to devise such a task is ascertaining
that, although it removes any inappropriate sources
of difficulty, it still constitutes a genuine test of the
concept of validity.
It might be noted, for example, that all of the
present experiments involved arguments varying
not only in validity but also in argument type, content, and/or truth status of premises and conclusions. It could reasonably be hypothesized that, after
brief guidance, fourth graders might fare quite well
in distinguishing valid from invalid variants of arguments if all the arguments were of the same general type (e.g., conjunctive), similar in content (e.g.,
animals), and neutral in truth value. But it is questionable whether such evidence would demonstrate
a genuine grasp of validity. As we have used that
term, understanding the concept of validity by definition includes differentiating it from empirical truth
and generalizing across some range of content areas
and argument types. Further research aimed at demonstrating greater competence at earlier ages should
involve tasks that, though simplified, still require a
sufficiently differentiated and generalizable concept
of validity to support the claim that what is being
assessed really is validity and not a more primitive
heuristic.
Although it remains possible that fourth graders understand validity, the current evidence strongly
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suggests that they do not. A useful direction for future research would be to further explore what they
do understand about the nature of logic.
We have seen that the fourth graders did not
spontaneously evaluate arguments on the basis of
their validity, a finding consistent with previous evidence that children of this age do not think about
logical form independent of empirical truth (Cummins, 1978; Osherson & Markman, 1975). Even
after (a) careful definition, examples and instructions and/or (b) systematic trial-by-trial feedback,
very few consistently distinguished valid from invalid variants of even the simplest arguments. The
fourth graders did, however, show an impressive
ability to select the correct conclusions for sets of
premises reflecting these same types of arguments,
a finding consistent with extensive evidence on deductive reasoning in young children (Braine & Rumain, 1983; Hawkins et al., 1984). Moreover, most
scored significantly above chance level in distinguishing valid from invalid arguments in Experiment 2.
We can account for the above pattern of findings by postulating (in accord with Moshman &
Timmons, 1982) that 9–10-year-olds do not explicitly think about logical form but are nonetheless implicitly aware of it. They can use their basic inference schemata (including an implicit awareness of
form) to reach or recognize logically necessary conclusions and can associate this with the idea of validity. However, because they do not think explicitly
about form, they do not make the abstract differentiation between validity of form and truth of content.
For this reason, they do not spontaneously sort arguments on the basis of form or validity (Experiment
l), they incorporate consideration of empirical truth
in judging the validity of arguments even after instructions and counterexamples (Experiment 2), and
they fail to profit from systematic feedback (Experiment 3). Many seventh graders, by contrast, spontaneously distinguished arguments on the basis of
form and validity, though evaluations based on empirical truth remained common. With appropriate
definition, examples, instructions, and/or feedback,
most were reasonably consistent in evaluating arguments on the basis of validity. Thus most 12–13year-olds, unlike most 9–10-year-olds, apparently do
have a sufficiently explicit concept of logical form
to differentiate validity of form from empirical truth,
though many failed to spontaneously apply this competence in Experiment 1.
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Finally, almost all college students spontaneously distinguished arguments on the basis of validity and, after definition, examples, instructions, and/
or feedback, were consistent in doing so. This impressive performance stands in sharp contrast to the
well-documented difficulties they have on a variety of complex logical reasoning tasks (e.g., Evans,
1983). Although college students often have genuine
difficulty with abstract deductive reasoning, they do
have a clear “sense of the game.”
It is noteworthy that, whereas fourth graders
showed little grasp of validity in any of the present
experiments, and college students showed excellent
performance in all of them, seventh graders did substantially better in Experiments 2 and 3, involving
definition, examples, instructions, and/or feedback,
than in Experiment 1, involving spontaneous application of the concept. Seventh-grade performance
was about midway between fourth-grade and college
performance in Experiment 1 but was statistically indistinguishable from college performance in Experiments 2 and 3. These findings suggest that, whereas
application of the concept of validity (performance)
increases over a wide age range (Experiment l), the
underlying competence develops fairly suddenly between ages 10 and 12 (Experiments 2 and 3).
Development of the concept of validity can
thus be divided into two phases (cf. Moshman, 1977;
Overton & Newman, 1982). The first phase involves
a relatively sudden emergence of the concept between ages 10 and 12. This is followed by increasing ability to use the concept under conditions that
are not ideal in eliciting it and/or in facilitating its
successful application (e.g., Experiment 1). The evidence for relatively sudden development of competence in this area is consistent with Fischer and
Pipp’s (1984) suggestion that cognitive development
in general is marked by relatively sudden changes in
“optimal level,” that is, in performance under optimal conditions. The specific ages correspond to what
Fischer and Pipp predict for the elementary level of
abstract competence. The present data directly address what has long been one of the central issues
in the study of the development of logical reasoning:
Do children’s logical abilities undergo qualitative
change? It appears to us that the clearest evidence
for such change comes not from studies of first-order
inferential abilities (how people reach conclusions
from premises) but rather from studies of metalogic
(how people construe the nature of logic) (e.g., Bereiter et al., 1979; Osherson & Markman, 1975; Pieraut-Le Bonniec, 1980; Somerville et al., 1979; see

also Braine & Rumain, 1983). Moshman and Timmons (1982) proposed that, in addition to the relatively early changes related to the concept of logical
necessity that have already been documented in the
literature, there is a second and later qualitative shift
consisting of comprehension of the concept of inferential validity and its differentiation from empirical
truth. The results of the present research support that
hypothesis.
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